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COM2MENTS
WHAT CHANCE FOR THE NEW CAR
PURCHASER OF A "LEMON"?
As the average new car buyer drives his automobile off the dealer's
lot, he probably anticipates dependable service for at least a year,
and in the majority of instances the buyer is not disappointed. How-
ever if the automobile should fail to give the anticipated service to
such an extent that the buyer's faith in the dependability of the car
is destroyed, what alternatives does the purchaser have? Is he com-
mitted to the original purchase or can he reasonably expect to get
out from under the responsibility incurred in the purchase of his
"lemon"? This question cannot be answered definitively, of course,
apart from an examination of the circumstances involved in a given
fact situation. The recent Iowa decision of Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc.1
gives one example of such a situation and serves as a frame of reference
for analysis of the problem in Kentucky.
On April 13, 1971, David Bayne purchased from Nail Motors in
Iowa City, Iowa, a 1971 Chevrolet Malibu for which he paid $3,812.02.
He signed the purchase order without reading it. There was no dis-
cussion of warranty and the salesman admitted that Bayne was in a
hurry. Four days after the purchase and after only 406 miles, the
Malibu came to a sudden stop from 25 miles per hour. The driver
stated that the force of the sudden deceleration would have thrown
him into the windshield if he had not been wearing his seat belt.
The sudden stop was caused by a complete absence of lubricant in
the differential. Since lubricant was not present, friction produced
such intense heat that the parts were mechanically frozen or welded
together, and it was necessary to use a torch to cut the differential
away from the axles. 2
Nall Motors had followed the inspection procedure set out by
General Motors, and the damage done was the direct result of the
negligence of General Motors in failing to install lubricant in the
rear axle housing of Bayne's automobile. Nail Motors attempted to
repair the car by replacing the entire differential except for one axle.
Nail's employees insisted that there was no damage which had not
been repaired. The District Court of Johnson County felt otherwise,
finding "that this was a major defect of a highly complex nature with
possibilities of damage to other major parts of the vehicle, subjecting
the purchaser to risk of future repairs and uncertainty."3
The dealer's responsibility in this case was predicated on the im-
1 Bayne v. Nal Motors, Inc., No. 40609 (D. Iowa, May 16, 1973).
2id.
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plied warranty that a new automobile sold by a dealer should be
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is sold.4 However, the pur-
chase order signed by Bayne contained the following disclaimer of
warranty:
It is understood and agreed by purchaser that the vehicle above
described is sold by the dealer "as is" and that the dealer makes
no warranty of merchantability of the vehicle and makes no war-
ranty that such vehicle is fit for any particular purpose.5
The court rather easily disposed of this waiver through application of
the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-3166 [hereinafter referred to as the
UCC]. Under this section waiver of implied warranty is permitted,
but any disclaimer of warranty must be conspicuous. Since Bayne had
not read the purchase order and the salesman had not discussed the
disclaimer with him, the disclaimer was held not to be conspicuous.
Any disclaimer of warranty that is not conspicuous is not valid, and
therefore, Nail's attempt to avoid warranties failed.
4The court based this finding on State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v.
Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961) and the UNIFORM Cor-
mERcrAL CODE § 2-315 [hereinafter cited as UCCI; IowA CODE AN . § 554.2815
(1972). This section grants the buyer an implied warranty of fitness:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the sellers skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The State Farm Insurance case involved the following disclaimer:
The dealer's obligation is limited to replacement of, without charge to
purchaser, such parts as shall be returned to dealer, with transportation
charges prepaid and as shall be acknowledged by dealer to be defective.
State Farm Insurance, supra, at 451.
This disclaimer was on the reverse side of the contract, and under the circum-
stances it was not specific enough to meet the standard of the UNroRM SA.Es Acr,
which was then the law in Iowa. A Kentucky case dealing with a similar question
is Water Works & Industrial Supply Co. v. Wilburn, 437 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1968).
There the Court of Appeals ruled that a seller's express warranty of material and
workmanship, with liability restricted to replacement cost excluding labor or
damages, did not exclude the implied warranty of fitness as guaranteed by Ky. REv.
STAT. § 355.2-315 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
5 Bayne, Replacement vs. Repair: A Consumer's Brief Challenges General
Motors, 24 SYRAcusE L. REv. 639, 679 (1973). The plaintiffs brief was published
as a lead article in this law review. In his brief, Bayne, a professor at the Uni-
versity of Iowa Law School, acted as his own counsel.
His brief makes many arguments not discussed by the court. For example,
the brief considers the public policy issues against the purchase order disclaimer
as the major considerations in favor of the plaintiff. The court, however, does not
go beyond the question of conspicuousness. The brief also discusses strict liability
in tort as a possible theory on which Bayne could recover.
6UCC § 2-316; IowA CODE ANN. §554.2316 (1972); KRS § 355.2-316. This
section reads in part:
... to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any
part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied war-
ranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
[Vol. 62
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Without the defense of disclaimer of warranty, the only other
theory on which the defendant could avoid rescission of the contract
was the seller's right to cure a breach by repair as guaranteed by UCC
§ 2-508.7 This section permits a seller to avoid revocation of ac-
ceptance by repairing minor defects. The distinction between a
repairable defect and one which makes the vehicle less acceptable
than a similar automobile is crucial to the result here.8 The court
felt that due to the tremendous heat and the force of the internal
impact involved, a reasonable buyer could not be expected to be
satisfied simply with a new differential. Since the possibility of dam-
age went further than the parts replaced, the court found that Bayne
was entitled to rescind his contract.9
The treatment of disclaimer of warranty and the question of
rescission in Bayne are the matters of importance to this discussion.
While the Iowa court easily discards the disclaimer and treats it only
as a minor issue in its brief opinion, Kentucky law would not permit a
court to achieve that result so easily. 0 An examination of the authori-
ties cited in Bayne and the Kentucky law on this issue is in order.
The Iowa court relied on the application of the UCC made in
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith" both for the proposition that there
is an implied warranty of fitness in the sale of a new automobile and
for the principle that this warranty cannot be restricted by express
warranty.12 The plaintiff in Zabriskie purchased a new Chevrolet
which became stuck in low gear less than a mile from the place where
7UCC § 2-508; IowA CODE ANN. § 554.2508 (1972); KRS § 355.2-508. This
section reads:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-
conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller
may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then
witun the contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender which the seller had
reasonable groun to believe would be acceptable with or without
money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have
a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
The application of this section to Bayne and other breach of warranty cases may
be more by analogy in that § 2-508 seems designed expressly for the nonconforming
delivery of goods situation. In such cases the buyer's actions constitute a rejection
of the goods and not a revocation of acceptance as we have in Bayne. J. WHrrE &
1R. SummEzs, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW UNDER =HE UNwoms CoxM2ancrAL CODE
§ 8-3, at 253-56 (1972) discusses this distinction, which basically turns on whether
or not the buyer has accepted the goods.
8 Comment, Sales of Personal Property-Breach of Warranty-Repair as a
Means of Cure Under Section 2-508 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 IowA L.
REv. 780, 788 (1967).
9 Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc., No. 40609 (D. Iowa, May 16, 1978).
1
0 Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966); and L. R.
Cooke Chevrolet Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Service of Lexington, 282 S.W.2d 349
(Ky. 1955).
11 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. 1968).
12 Id. at 198.
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his wife took possession of the vehicle. The dealer replaced the trans-
mission with one from another automobile rather than a new one.
On the reverse side of the purchase order was a denial of all war-
ranties except the express dealer warranty, which allowed only for the
replacement of defective parts. The New Jersey court permitted
rescission of the contract.
The court used the "conspicuous" requirement of the UCC as one
method of attacking the disclaimer of warranty, 13 but it also found the
disclaimer void on grounds of unconscionability and for reasons of
public policy.14 These policy considerations form the more straight-
forward approach to the problem. Citing § 2-30215 on unconscion-
ability as a basis for its approach, the court in Zabriskie quotes from an
earlier New Jersey decision, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 6
in which the court stated:
... we are of the opinion that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of
an implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations
arising therefrom is so inimical to the public good as to Compel an
adjudication of its invalidity.17
The disadvantageous position of the consumer in the purchase of a
new automobile precipitates the application of remedies against pos-
sible unconscionable contracts. He must submit to a standardized
adhesion contract or forego the purchase of a new car. His con-
tractual options are eliminated by the common practices of the auto-
mobile industry. 8 In reality, it is not possible for him to purchase a
new car without accepting the terms of the dealer's contract, which
terms for the most part are designed to serve the dealer's convenience.
This situation would seem to allow unconscionability as a line of
reasoning in cases involving disclaimers of warranty. Despite this pos-
sibility courts are often satisfied with the "conspicuous" requirement
13Id. at 199. "The attempted limitations of those warranties were not 'con-
spicuous' and hence failed in their purpose." This is required by N.J. STAT. ANN. §
12A2-816 (1972).
14 Id. at 198.
15 UCC § 2-302(1) reads:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at -the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
16 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
17 Id. at 95.
18 Id. at 85. The court stated:
In a society such as ours, where the automobile is a common and necessary
adjunct of daily life, and where its use is so fraught with danger to the
driver, passengers and the public, the manufacturer is under a special
obligation in connection with the construction, promotion and sale of his
cars. Consequently, the courts must examine purchase agreements closely
to see if consumer and public interests are treated fairly.
[Vol. 62
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of § 2-316 as a means of voiding a disclaimer of warranty,19 and in
that way decisions are more particularized to specific fact situations.
The trial court in Bayne found violation of the "conspicuous" require-
ment sufficient to void the disclaimer, but the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky has not always been willing to follow this approach.
The Kentucky case of Myers v. Land20 uses both the failure to
express the disclaimer plainly and failure of consideration as the basis
for rescission of a contract for the sale of a concrete mixer. This case
was decided under the Uniform Sales Act, but the language of part
of the Court's decision is similar to language used in discussing the
"conspicuous" requirement of the UCC in later cases. After recog-
nizing the ability of contracting parties to eliminate implied and
express warranties, the Court stated, 'ut we have always required
that such limitation of liability shall be plainly expressed."2 1 They
found the disclaimer involved explicit enough but still ineffective be-
cause it was buried "in a long and formidable document prepared by
the seller and that it is doubtless unnoticed or its import uncompre-
hended by the buyer."22 In addition to attacking the disclaimer on
the grounds that it was not plainly expressed, the Court entertained
policy arguments:
Anyone brought up to believe that for every wrong there is a
remedy will pause before saying that the seller will escape all
liability by merely putting in an order blank a statement to the
effect that there is no assurance that the buyer will get a machine
that will work. We have paused for the moment and have readily
concluded that the avoidance of liability under such a circumstance
is not permitted by the law.28
Other jurisdictions share this disapproval of disclaimers,24 but later
Kentucky decisions have altered the impact of Myers.
25
19 Comment, Rescission of an Auto Sale Under the Uniform Commercial Code
-How to Get Rid of a Four-Wheeled Lemon, 26 U. MIAMI L. Bxv. 648 (1972).
20235 S.W.2d 988 (Ky. 1951).
21 Id. at 990.
22Id.
23 Id. at 991.24 Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 437 S.W.2d 784 (Ark. 1969);
Tiger Motor Co., Inc. v. McMurty, 224 So.2d 638 (Ala. 1969).
In Marion Power Shovel Co., the disclaimer was in an instruction booklet
delivered subsequent to the sale and the disclaimer was not conspicuous. Tiger
Motor Co. also involved a warranty that was delivered after the sale. In that case
the buyer did not receive the warranty until the day after he accepted his new
automobile, and there was no evidence that he was informed of the disclaimer
provisions. These two and other cases holding disclaimers void are discussed in
West, Disclaimer of Warranties-Its Curse and (Possible) Cure, 76 CoMmrs. L.J. 253,
256 (1971).
25 L. R. Cooke Chevrolet Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Service of Lexington 282
S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1955); and Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2a 843
(Ky. 1970).
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The Court of Appeals upheld an automobile dealer's disclaimer in
L. R. Cooke Chevrolet Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Service of Lexing-
ton.26 It acknowledged Myers, but found that the equities involved
did not call for the same policy considerations used to avoid the dis-
claimer in the earlier decision. In Cooke, the buyer of a new truck
claimed breach of the implied warranty that the truck was reasonably
suited for the purposes for which it was intended to be used. This
claim arose out of an accident that occurred two weeks after the
vehicle was purchased. The driver of the truck claimed he lost control
due to vibration in the front wheels. He had not previously reported
this vibration to anyone, and the witnesses to the accident could not
say what caused the truck to leave the road.27 Plaintiff's use of the
truck before the accident without giving notice of the defect to the
defendant influenced the Court's decision to distinguish this case from
Myers. In Myers the machinery was wholly inadequate for the purpose
intended.28 Another case upholding the disclaimer of warranty is Cox
Motor Co. v. Castle.29 The court allowed a rescission of the contract
in that case by finding a violation of express warranty. The fact that
the Court saw this alternative may have deterred it from finding the
disclaimer invalid. Instead of invalidating the disclaimer, the Court
acknowledged the dealer's right to exclude implied warranties and
limit remedies for breach of warranty under Kentucky Revised Statutes
§ 355.2-316 [hereinafter referred to as KRS].30 The Court referred to
section 2-316 of the UCC without any mention of the requirement
that the disclaimer be conspicuous, the point which was stressed in
Bayne.
The Court of Appeals has not always been unwilling to use the
"conspicuous" requirements of section 2-316(2). In Massey-Ferguson,
Inc. v. Utley,31 the Court applied this provision in order to hold a
disclaimer invalid3 2 Where there is breach of express warranty, it is
not as essential to find a disclaimer invalid in order to grant the buyer
relief. The Court referred to the definition of "conspicuous" in the
261d. This case will be discussed further in reference to the idea of failure of
consideration as a basis for rescission.
27282 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Ky. 1955).
281d. at 351.
29 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966).
30 Id. at 431.
81439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969).
32Id. at 58. This case involved a breach of implied warranty of fitness of
farm machinery purchased by Utley for use on his farm. Utley asserted this war-
ranty as a defense to an action to recover payment for the machinery. Massey-
Ferguson's principal argument was that the defense of implied warranty is ex-
pressly excluded by the terms of the sales contract.
[Vol. 62
Code, KRS § 355.1-201(10), 33 noting that this section leaves the final
decision of what is conspicuous to the court. In Utley, the language
expressly excluding implied warranties was on the back of the contract
form with a number of other provisions. The exclusionary language
was not in larger or contrasting type. There was a heading to the
section containing the disclaimer, but there was nothing that indicated
a disclaimer was present. The heading merely read "Warranty and
Agreement." 4 Under these facts, the Court was willing to hold the
dealer to implied warranties despite the attempted disclaimer.
In Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards,35 the Kentucky Court found
a disclaimer conspicuous even though it was on the reverse side of the
contract. The front of the contract made the sale subject to terms
on the reverse side, and the exclusion was in heavier type than the
other paragraphs on the back of the contract. While the Court of
Appeals has applied the requirement that all disclaimers be con-
spicuous, it has not been willing to do so without close scrutiny of
the contract involved. In addition, the Court did not apply the con-
spicuousness requirement of the UCC to the Cox case, supra, involving
an automobile dealer's disclaimer of warranty similar to the disclaimer
in Bayne. Nor did the Court find the disclaimer in Cox void on grounds
of unconscionability or for reasons of public policy.
Assuming a wronged new car buyer can avoid the disclaimer in
the purchase order for his vehicle, he still must overcome the dealer's
right to repair36 in order to be relieved of his obligations in con-
nection with the purchase. The court in Bayne found that Nall
Motors had a right to repair under UCC § 2-508 but that this right
was limited to the correction of minor defects. In this circumstance,
the defect was "of a highly complex nature with possibilities of damage
to other major parts of the vehicle, subjecting the purchaser to risks
of future repairs and uncertainty."37
In deciding whether a flaw is minor, important considerations
include whether the correction would leave no evidence of the prior
,3 UCC § 1-201(10) reads:
"Conspicuous"; A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it. A printed heading in capitals... is conspicuous. Language
in the body of a form is "conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting
type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous".
Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the
court.
34 439 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1969).
35 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970).
36 J. Wrx & R. SuMMams, supra note 7, at 266-70.
87 Bayne v. Nail Motors, Inc., No. 40609 (D. Iowa, May 16, 1973).
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condition nor reduce the value or quality of the vehicle as originally
purchased.3 8 If a defect indicates that an item is basically of poor
quality or could not reasonably be expected to be corrected to the
buyer's satisfaction, the seller ought not to be permitted to repair.
Another factor is the complexity of the device.39 Therefore, the effect
of a defect on an automobile's entire structure must be considered.
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith,40 adds another element to the
question of what is a repairable defect-the effect on the buyer's faith
in his purchase. The Court stated:
For a majority of people the purchase of a new car is a major in-
vestment rationalized by the peace of mind that flows from its
dependability and safety. Once their faith is shaken, the vehicle
loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an instrument
whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is
fraught with apprehension.
4'
This idea was followed in Bayne, and it served the plaintiff's case well
in that the possible internal damages done to his car was his reason
for refusing to accept the cure as tendered by the dealer.
In automobile warranty cases, another issue may arise as to the
burden of identifying the defect claimed. At least one court has
maintained that, in order for the plaintiff to recover under the express
warranty for replacement of defective parts, he must prove that the
malfunction was caused by a defect and also present evidence proving
precisely what was wrong with the car.42 The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky has taken a different view. In Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle,43
it rejected the dealer's claim that the duty was on the buyer to point
out what parts were defective. The Court cited the "examination" re-
quirement placed on the seller by the contract as well as the relative
abilities of the two parties to determine the defect involved.44
Cox involves another aspect of warranty-defects under the auto-
mobile dealer's express warranty. In Cox, as noted previously, the
Court upheld the disclaimer of warranty, but it nevertheless allowed
the plaintiff to recover the price of the truck he purchased by finding
a breach of express warranty. The Court found that the seller was
confronted with a well-founded complaint of a defective condition.
38 Comment, Sales of Personal Property-Breach of Warranty-Repair as a
Means of Cure Under Section 2-508 of the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note
8, at 788.
39 Id. at 789.
40 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. 1968).
41 Id. at 205.42 Collum v. Fred Tuck Buick, 285 N.E.2d 532, 536 (IMI. App. Ct. 1972).
43 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966).
44 Id. at 431.
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Within a month after the purchase of the truck, the buyer began
making complaints to the dealer about instability in the truck's align-
ment. He made repeated complaints until the truck broke down two
years after it was purchased. The seller's actions constituted a breach
of express warranty when he refused to respond in good faith to
the buyer's reasonable complaints. Since the seller had the obligation
to identify the defect, his refusal to recognize that there was a defect
caused the Court to consider the whole truck "as one big defective
part."45 This had the same effect as allowing a rescission of the con-
tract. Therefore, "the measure of damages properly would be the
cost of replacing the truck with one not defective which would be the
same as the difference in market price" 46
In Cox the Court of Appeals also cited KRS § 355.2-7194r as grounds
on which parties to a contract could exclude implied warranties and
could limit remedies for breach of warranty.48 However, the Court
did not refer particularly to KRS § 355.2-719(2) which would seem
to be grounds for another consumer argument. That subsection quali-
fies the contracting parties' ability to limit or exclude remedies. It
reads, "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy
to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Chapter." In situations like Bayne and Cox, it would seem that the ex-
press warranty in the contract fails of its essential purpose to give the
buyer protection against unanticipated failure in his vehicle.
49
Thus far we have looked at two methods of granting an automobile
buyer an action for the price of his car. The Bayne approach is
through rejection of the dealer's disclaimer followed by close scrutiny
of the curability of the defect involved. The Court of Appeals in Cox,
reluctant to discard disclaimer so easily, nevertheless granted the buyer
the price through an unusual application of breach of express warranty.
The Court's "one-big-defective-part" theory may be the preferable
45 Id.
46 Id.
47UCC § 2-719(1) reads:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and (3) of this section and
of § 2-718 on liquidation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this article and may limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this article, as by limiting
the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price
or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
48402 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ky. 1966).
49 Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971). The court held
that the express warranty failed in its essential purpose, that is to give the buyer
a car free of substantial defect.
1974]
KENTuciY LAw JouRMN[
approach for a plaintiff in Kentucky, but Myers v. Land0 gives the
Kentucky plaintiff another option in certain circumstances. It may be
remembered that in Myers the Court used the equitable argument of
failure of consideration in addition to breach of warranty as a basis
for rescinding the contract.51 This argument is applicable to a case
where the purchased article fails to do what it was agreed that it
should do in the bargaining between the parties. The Court in Myers
stated the argument well:
... to sell a man a machine for manufacturing a merchantable
product that will not accomplish that purpose at all is a breach of
the contract itself rather than a mere breach of warranty, although
were such implication of law not excluded, that too would sustain a
right of action. If the machine is worthless for the purpose for
which it was sold, there is a failure of consideration.
5 2
However, Myer's applicability to automobile purchase cases is limited
to situations in which the car's defect is well beyond inconvenience
in operation. The Court of Appeals indicated this in L. R. Cooke
Chevrolet Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Service of Lexington.5 3 There the
Court upheld the disclaimer and found no failure of consideration
since the plaintiff continued to use the truck despite what he claimed
to be a slight "shimmy." 4 The Court distinguished the case from
Myers by stating:
Since the equities of the situation do not justify a rescission of the
contract, and inasmuch as the sales contract excluded all implied
warranties the court should have directed a verdict for the ap-
pellant [the dealer]. 5
The fact situation in Bayne was very favorable to the plaintiff.
There was a possibility of permanent damage, and the case probably
could have been decided on the "defective car" theory of Cox. By
finding the possibly permanently damaged car as a "defect in itself,"
the court in Bayne would not have had to get involved in the issue
of the validity of the disclaimer. However, there are situations where
it would not be warranted to rule the entire car defective. In these
cases a Kentucky court might well uphold a disclaimer and rule for
5o 235 S.W.2d 988 (Ky. 1951).
51 Comment, Breach of Warranty of Fitness as Failure of Consideration-Myers
v. Land, 42 Ky. L.J. 286 (1953).
52 Myers v. Land, 285 S.W.2d 988, 991 (Ky. 1951).
53 282 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1955).
54 Id. at 351.
55 Id.
[Vol. 62.
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the dealer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has not construed the
conspicuousness requirement as to disclaimers as broadly as the court
in Bayne, nor has it followed the same theories on the issue of rescission
versus repair. Therefore, while a Kentucky buyer of a "lemon" may be
able to recover the price of his car, the theory of his recovery may
have to be based on breach of express warranty.
Joseph R. Goeke
